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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Using PSSA idea, Based on Hazard Identification, Identify
Areas of Particular Concern to Help Mitigate the HFO Spill
Risk in Arctic

The Arctic shipping routes saw an increase in ship numbers in recent years, posing
navigational safety and environmental protection challenges on IMO, Coastal States,
Flag States, shipowners, etc. Among the environmental issues, pollution related to
HFO is the most noticeable one.

This paper gives suggestions about mitigation of HFO risk based on HFO spill hazard
identification and combining PSSA idea. And the key finding of this paper is that, to
better protect Arctic from HFO pollution, accidental oil spill should be emphasis, and
based on the hazard identified (grounding, fire/explosion, hull/machinery, ice damage
and collision) which are most likely to result in HFO spill, 3 categories of areas shall
be focused on. They are 4 high-traffic-risk areas, 5 high-ice-risk areas and 11
ecologically sensitive areas. In these areas, PSSA ideas could be applied to. Establish
traffic separation scheme and precautionary areas in high-traffic-risk areas to reduce
accident risks of collision, grounding, etc. Adopt pilot and icebreaker assistance,
designate anchorage area and set mandatory speed limitation in high-ice-risk areas to
reduce ice damage. Establish areas to be avoided for specific type or tonnage of ships
to protect ecologically sensitive areas.

KEY WORDS: HFO, Arctic, Environmental Protection, pollution, AAPC, PSSA,
Hazard Identification
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background Information

The Arctic area is attracting the attention of the international community, for the
changing climate, economic value and nature resource. In the recent 20 years, with the
global warming, the Arctic sea ice is melting rapidly and ice extent is shrinking, so
viable trans-Arctic shipping routes will become increasingly available for longer
periods of the year. Model simulations for the 21st century (using Global Climate
Models) indicate a summer ice-free Arctic Ocean by 2050, a future scenario of great
significance for Arctic shipping and offshore development (Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment 2009 Report [AMSA, 2009], P. 92). This scenario is promising since the
economic value of Arctic shipping route makes it under the spotlight, on account of
the nearly 40% shortened distance compared to traditional Asia-Europe shipping route
and Asia-America shipping route (China Classification Society [CCS], 2016). In
addition, the Artic area is rich in nature resources like oil, natural gas, minerals.
The proven oil reserves account for 13% of the world reserves and nature gas account
for 30% of the world reserves (United States Geological Survey [USGS], 2008). The
Arctic is on the verge of a new era of exploiting nature resources.

However, ships operating in Arctic areas have faced with additional risks arising from
ice, extremely cold weather and other harsh conditions, given the unique geographical
location and special environmental conditions in Arctic. The additional risks pose
threats not only on navigation safety, but also on the unique and fragile environment,
which once destroyed would be difficult to resume. Moreover, the ships operating in
Artic use more heavy fuel oil (HFO) than distillate fuel or liquified natural gas (LNG)
for cost concern, regardless of HFO do more damage to Arctic environment than other
fuel oil due to its characteristics.
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To deal with the safety and environment risks, international community has taken steps:
from international level, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), from regional
level, Arctic countries strengthened maritime cooperation and signed legally binding
agreements on Arctic maritime safety, and from national level, the coastal states Russia
and Canada recently amended national regulation associated with Arctic shipping.

However, if compare the environmental protection in Arctic with Antarctic, the weak
link of Arctic environmental protection will be exposed. The Arctic is currently less
protected by international law compared to the Antarctic (Polar Code Hazard
Identification Workshop, 2011). On the HFO issue, there is an absence of regulation
in Arctic while HFO is prohibited in Antarctic under The International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Chapter 9 regulation 43.

In recent years, states like Canada and the US1 and Non-Government Organizations
(NGO) such as the Clean Arctic Alliance2 and Hurtigruten3are calling for a phase-out
of the use of HFO by ships in a timely manner and urge IMO to advance this goal. In
April 2018, Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 72nd session

1

Canada and the US announced a joint “phase down” of HFO from their respective Arctic regions. Both
countries had formally notified the IMO that a “heavy fuel oil spill in the Arctic could cause long-term
damage to the environment”.
2

The Clean Arctic Alliance is made up of 18 not-for-profit organizations committed to phasing out the
use of HFO as marine fuel in the Arctic:
Alaska Wilderness League | Bellona | Clean Air Task Force | Danish Ecological Council | ECODES |
Environmental Investigation Agency | European Climate Foundation | Friends of the Earth US | Greenpeace
| Iceland Nature Conservation Association | Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union | Ocean
Conservancy | Pacific Environment | Seas at Risk | Stand.earth | Surfrider Foundation Europe | Transport &
Environment | WWF
3

These two NGOs lunched a new initiative named Arctic Commitment at the Arctic Frontiers conference
in January 2017. The Arctic Commitment has already been signed by more than 80 parties and recently
signed by the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, Germany.
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considered the development of measures to reduce risks of use and carriage of HFO
by ships in Arctic waters. In addition, as the implementation of 0.5% global fuel
Sulphur cap in 2020, the cost to switch all ships in the Arctic fleet from HFO to
distillate would be much less in 2020 and 2025, as HFO is expected to represent only
7% of the fuel used by ships in the Arctic (Biswajoy & Comer, 2017), which means
the Sulphur cap policy would minimized the difficulties in cost aspect. The trend of
ban on HFO in Arctic seems to be clear, although there might be a long decisionmaking and gradually implementing process.

1.2

Review of Previous Research

HFO in Arctic is primarily studied by 3 organizations: IMO, Maritime Environment
Protection Committee (PAME) and International Council on Clean Transportation
(ICCT). And Det Norske Veritas (DNV) participates in both IMO and PAME’s study.
PAME’s study mainly emphasizes on the carriage and use of HFO, as well as the risk
of HFO in Arctic. Three phases of Heavy Fuel in the Arctic Reports are the research
achievement. ICCT focus on the harm of HFO in Arctic and call for a ban. A series of
papers, reports provide data revealing the wide use of HFO in different types of ships
and evaluating alternatives from economy aspect.

1.3

Terms Definition

1.3.1

Arctic Delimitation

For use in this study，the Arctic area uses the same definition as used in the Polar Code:

Arctic waters means those waters which are located north of a line from the

3

latitude 58°00′.0N and longitude042°00′.0W to latitude64°37′.0N, longitude 035°
27′.0W and thence by a rhumb line to latitude 67°03′.9N, longitude 026°33′.4W
and thence by a rhumb line to the latitude 70 ° 49 ′ .56N and longitude 008 °
59′.61W(SΦrkapp, Jan Mayen) and by the southern shore of Jan Mayen to 73°
31′.6N and 019°01′.0E by the Island of BjΦrnΦya, and thence by a great circle
line to the latitude 68°38′.29 N and longitude 043°23′.08E(Cap Kanin Nos) and
hence by the northern shore of the Asian Continent eastward to the Bering Strait
and thence from the Bering Strait westward to latitude 60°N as far as Ⅰl’pyrsiy and
following the 60 th North parallel eastward to latitude 60°N as far as and including
Etolin Strait and thence by the northern shore of the North American continent as
far south as latitude 60°N and thence eastward along parallel of latitude 60°N, to
longitude 056°37′.1W and thence to the latitude 58°00′.0N, longitude 042°00′.0W
(Polar Code, 2014).
The delimitation of Arctic area in IMO is shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1-The Delimitation of Arctic Area
Source: Biswajoy & Comer. (2017). Alternatives to heavy fuel oil use in the Arctic: Economic and
environmental trade-offs

1.3.2

Arctic Shipping Routes

There are two navigable routes in Arctic waters: Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the
Northwest Passage (NWP) like it is shown in figure 2.

NSR is from Iceland in the west, through Barents Sea, eastward along the northern
seas of Eurasia to Bering Strait. This route is mostly within in Exclusive Economic

5

Zone (EEZ) of Russia's northern border, from Murmansk to Provideniya, 2,600
nautical miles. It is opened in 1931 for domestic shipping exclusively. In the year 1991,
Russia opened this route for international traffic. Japan and Norway were two of first
few to begin utilizing the route. So far, this route is mainly used by Russia ships.

NWP runs through an archipelago of islands in northern Canada, from Davis Strait
and Baffin Bay in the east to Bering straits in the west, linking the Pacific Ocean and
Atlantic Ocean through the northern coast of North America.

Figure 2-The Arctic Routes
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Source: AMSA, 2009

1.3.3

HFO

The MARPOL AnnexⅠhas described the characteristics of HFO when making special
requirements for the use and carriage of oil in the Antarctica. In this paper, HFO is
defined as the oil which has the equivalent characteristics specified by the IMO:


crude oil having a density, at 15°C, higher than 900 kg/m3;



oil, other than crude oil, having a density, at 15°C, higher than 900 kg/m3 or
a kinematic viscosity, at 50°C, higher than 180 mm2/s;



1.3.4

or bitumen, tar and their emulsions (MARPOL).

Hazard Identification

According to IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) guidance documents, hazard is
defined as a potential to threaten human life, health, property or the environment. And
hazard identification is the first step followed by risk analysis, risk control, etc. In the
context of HFO spill in Arctic, this paper will try to identify the potential accidents
which can contribute to HFO spill, like grounding, collision, ice damage, etc.

1.3.5

Arctic Areas of Particular Concern

For study purpose, a concept Arctic Areas of Particular Concern (AAPC) is raised in
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this paper. Applying Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) idea to Arctic, some
associated measures shall be put forward, commonly navigational safety measures.
Based on hazard identification, 3 categories of AAPCs within Arctic are identified to
draw and implement the measures. Three categories of AAPCs are identified using
different criteria: one is area of great ecological significance where the ecological cost
is too high to afford if HFO spill happened, the second is areas of busy traffic and have
higher potential of accident, the third is areas with severe ice regime thus ships are
more likely to be faced with ice damage. AAPCs can also function as a reminder to
raise mariners environmental protection awareness.

1.4

Objective of Study

The primary purpose of this paper is to identify significant areas that shall be
emphasized on when consider reducing the HFO accidental spill risk. The secondary
purpose is to offer some suggestions and measures targeting at hazards in different
AAPCs as transitional measures before HFO is prohibited in Arctic.

1.5

An Outline of Chapter Organization

This paper consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 give an overview of the HFO in Arctic,
including the use of HFO by Arctic ships, the regulation status in national and
international levels. This Chapter emphasizes on the identifying the hazards which are
most likely to result in HFO spill. Chapter 3 provides a summary of existing PAASs
and analyzed its main idea. From two detailed PSSA cases, the commonly used
measures are synthesized. Chapter 3 also explained why not designate Artic area as a
PSSA through IMO directly. Chapter 4 is the key part of this paper, concentrating on
the identification of AAPCs based on description of the areas’ characteristics and
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conditions, and give some relevant suggestions. Finally, the last chapter discourses the
overall summaries and conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2: HFO in Arctic
2.1
2.1.1

The Current Situation of the Use of HFO in Arctic
The wide Use of HFO in Arctic Ships

HFO is the preferred fuel of the marine transportation industry because it is widely
available and less expensive than cleaner distillate fuels. A report from DNV, using
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data of an entire year of 2012, has shown that
in the total 1347 vessels operating in Arctic, 341 vessels were assumed operating on
HFO, accounting for 28%. Note that although by far the minority of vessels are
operating on HFO, the volume of HFO carried as fuel is far greater due to the larger
size vessels using HFO (DNV, 2013), as figure 3 and figure 4 demonstrate.

Later, a research conducted by ICCT in 2015 shows a similar result: In 2015, 2086
Arctic ships carry 835,000 metric tons of HFO and 255,000 metric tons of distillate as
main bunker fuel. While only 925 ships operated on HFO (44% of the Arctic ships),
they account for 76% of the volume of bunker fuel onboard ships operating in Arctic
(Comer,2016).

Number of vessels and fuel type
28%

72%

Vessels operating on HFO

Vessels operating on distillates

Figure 3-Proportions of Vessels Using HFO versus Distillate Fuel in the Arctic
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2.
10

Volume of fuel carried by vessels
25%

75%

HFO

Distillate

Figure 4-Proportion HFO versus Distillate Fuel in-board Ships in the Arctic
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2.

2.1.2

Dominant Ship Type in Terms of Using HFO

In Arctic, bulk carriers carried the most HFO onboard in 2015, followed by containers
and oil tankers. The distances traveled are also counted in, because the more distances
HFO transported by ship, the greater the oil spill risk. In terms of distance traveled,
bulk carriers, containers and oil tankers are still the top 3.
Table 1-HFO Carriage and Transport as Bunker Fuel in the Arctic, 2015
Ship Type

Fuel

% of total fuel Fuel

%

onboard (t)

onboard

transported

transported

of

(106 t-nm)
HFO

827,300

76%

2,070

56%

Bulk carrier

247,500

22.8%

280

7.5%

Container

112,800

10.4%

100

2.7%

Oil tanker

110.700

10.2%

100

2.6%
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fuel

General cargo

77,200

7.1%

110

3.1

Fishing Vessel

67,600

6.2%

10

0.2%

Chemical tanker

51,800

4.8%

0

0.1%

Refrigerated bulk

49,700

4.6%

300

8.1%

Cruise

40,600

3.7%

550

14.8%

Service vessel

30,000

2.8%

0

0.0%

Vehicle

19,100

1.8%

0

0.0%

Tug

6,500

0.6%

0

0.1%

Ro-ro

5,800

0.5%

320

8.7%

Offshore

3,100

0.3%

120

3.2%

Ferry-ro-pax

2,200

0.2%

10

0.1%

gas 2,100

0.2%

160

4.4%

Liquefied
tankers

Passenger ferry

500

0.0%

20

0.6%

Other

200

0.0%

1

0.0%

Yacht

-

-

-

-

Distillate

251,500

23%

1,490

41%

LNG

3,800

0.4%

3

0.1%

0.3%

120

3%

100%

3,680

100%

Nuclear
Total

2,800
1,085,400

Source: Comer, B., Olmer, N., Mao, X.L., Roy, B. & Rutherford, D. (2017). Prevalence of heavy fuel oil
and black carbon in Arctic shipping, 2015 to 2025.

2.2

Regulation Status of HFO in Artic
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2.2.1
2.2.1.1

Important Regulations in Arctic Environmental Protection
Polar Code

Polar Code, the regulation for ships operating in Arctic and Antarctic waters, has
entered into force on January 1, 2017, marking a milestone in addressing international
concern about the protection of the polar environment. To achieve the goal of ship
safety and environmental protection in polar areas, it makes more stringent
requirements for polar ships’ technology, operation and navigation, covering almost all
the aspects of ships sailing in polar waters. The basic structure of Polar Code is
illustrated in Figure 5. PartⅠSafety measures, for reducing the risk for loss of lives and
property as well as environmental risks, includes ship structure, shipbuilding,
equipment, communication, operation, training. PartⅡpollution prevention measures
includes pollution from oil, sewage, noxious liquid substances in bulk and garbage. So
far, it seems that the additional environmental requirements for Arctic areas are stricter
compared to other areas and at least can address regular discharge from normal
operations. Unfortunately, although had been twice discussed on IMO sessions4, the
issue of HFO in Arctic has failed to be involved in Polar Code Ⅱ -A mandatory
requirements, only making an additional guidance that ships are encouraged to apply
regulation 435 of MARPOL Annex Ⅰwhen operating in Arctic waters thus leaving a
huge environmental pollution risk in Arctic.

4

th

st

This issue had been discussed on DE 57 session in March 2013, according to the instructions of MSC 91
th
session. Then on MEPC 65 session in May 2013, it was argued that a little early to discuss the issue of HFO
in Arctic.
5
Prohibiting the carriage in bulk as cargo, or carriage and use as fuel in Antarctic, which was explained.
13

Figure 5-The Basic Structure of Polar Code

Figure 6-Basic Structure of PartⅡ-Pollution Prevention Measures

2.2.1.2

Russia’s National Legislation

The Ministry of Transport of Russia amended RULES of navigation in the water area
of the Northern Sea Route in January 2017 to implement the Polar Code. In terms of
environmental protection, Russia has much lower standards than Canada. The
14

requirements to ships pertaining to the protection of the marine environment from the
oil pollution from ships are as follows:


Tank or tanks capacity for the collection of oil residues should be sufficient taking
into consideration type of ship power plant and duration of voyage in the water
area of the Northern Sea Route6;



Discharge of oil residues into the water area of the Northern Sea Route is
prohibited7.

2.2.1.3

Canada National Legislation

Aiming at extending jurisdiction and claiming sovereign rights through legislation,
Canada has introduced the highest environmental protection standards since
1960s and 1970s adopting Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. There are two
regulations under the act, Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Regulations and Arctic
Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations which was repealed by a new regulation
Arctic Shipping Safety and Pollution Prevention Regulations in August 2017. The new
one incorporates the Polar Code into Canada’s domestic legislation, which means,
Canada’s national regulation is not stricter than Polar Code and failed to cover HFO.
2.2.2

The Lack of Effective Regulation on HFO in Arctic

The three regulations mentioned above are the most significant legislations in
international level and national level respectively. Unfortunately, none of them cover
the regulation of HFO.

6

RULES of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, Ⅷ. Requirements to ships pertaining to
the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment from the pollution from ships, Article
61,1).
7
RULES of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, Ⅷ. Requirements to ships pertaining to
the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment from the pollution from ships, Article 65.
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In terms of Polar Code, the failure to phase out the use of HFO in Artic triggered
dissatisfaction, though it is already banned in Antarctica. Sue Libenson, Pacific
Environment, argued that while the Polar Code is a good step at recognizing the special
risks of Arctic shipping, it still fails to directly address the HFO spill, which is the
highest potential risk. John Kaltenstein, marine policy analyst, considers that the Polar
Code doesn’t do nearly enough to tackle substantial risks posed by shipping: use of
noxious HFO in the Arctic.

Similarly, the Canada Regulation was pointed out by environmental protection
organization for lack of habitat protection and the ban on HFO 8 . Let alone Russia,
arguing against the ban on HFO for many year, seems to be the last state willing to
prohibit the use of HFO9.

2.2.3

The Reason Why There Is an Absence of Regulation or Ban on HFO

HFO is prohibited in Antarctic and Svalbard archipelago, but Arctic yet has not. The
reason lies in the High Economic Cost of Switching HFO to Distillate or LNG. Table 2
illustrates the total Arctic fleet cost of switching HFO to distillate or LNG in 2015 and
the projection of 2020 and 2025. The total cost of switching HFO to distillate was
59,770,320 dollars and is projected to be 4,338,746 and 5,208,624 dollars in 2020 and
2025 representatively (it will cost less in 2020 and 2025 because of the IMO 0.5%
global fuel S standard), while the cost of switching to LNG is negative. However,
switching to LNG will need to retrofit the ship’s fuel and propulsion systems, in
addition to the huge expenditure of refilling station.
Table 2-Costs and Benefits of Switching from Residual Fuels to Distillate or LNG
8

http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2018/01/12/arctic-shipping-regulations-oceans-north-canada/, retrieved in 20
June, 2018.
9
Russia has the most ships operating on HFO in Arctic, consuming 56% of the total volume of HFO, making
it the largest stakeholder in Arctic HFO. For further information see Comer et al., (2017). Prevalence of
heavy fuel oil and black carbon in Arctic shipping, 2015 to 2025.
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Source: Roy, B & Comer, B. (2017). Alternatives to heavy fuel oil use in the Arctic: Economic and
environmental tradeoffs.

Different from Antarctic, Arctic has permanent resident. The huge expenditures
resulted from the ban on HFO will eventually be paid by the businesses in Arctic, Artic
people and costal states, naturally leading to resistance when carrying out the regulation
of HFO.

2.3
2.3.1

Risk of HFO

2.3.1.1

Hazard Identification
Discharge from Normal Operation

During normal ship operating procedures, ships may continuously or intermittently
17

discharge pollutant into water and air, such as gas emissions to air, dirty water or waste
into sea. Clearly HFO might be discharged solely or along with ballast water, oily
mixtures or sewage into the sea if the ships operate on HFO. But Polar Code has already
made mandatory requirements for zero discharge of oil or oily mixtures, significantly
reducing the oil discharge from normal operation, so it is out of the scope of this paper.
2.3.1.2

Accidental Oil Spill

In addition to the common hazards worldwide, like grounding, collision, fire, etc., polar
waters introduce new hazards to oil spill, e.g., ice loads, icing freezing in etc., and add
the common hazards’ risk level (figure 7).

Figure 7-Risk Elements Worldwide versus the Arctic
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2.

DNV report in 2013 pointed out that Arctic ship accidents potentially cause oil spill
includes the following categories: grounding, collision, hull/machinery, fire/explosion
and ice damage.



Grounding: Includes ships reported hard and fast for an appreciable period of
time as well as incidents reported touching the sea bottom. This category
includes entanglement on under water wrecks or obstructions.
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Collision: Striking or being struck by another ship, regardless of whether under
way, anchored or moored. This category does not include striking under water
wrecks. (IHS Fairplay, 2012)



Hull/Machinery: Includes ships lost or damaged as a result of hull/machinery
damage or failure which is not attributable to any other categories.



Fire/Explosion: Where the fire and/or explosion is the first event reported
(except where first event is a hull/machinery failure leading to fire/explosion).



Ice damage: This category may include ice bergs as collision hazard, ship
pushed aground by moving ice or ice bergs as ship crush hazard (structural
failure).

2.3.2

Estimated Accident Frequencies

Accident frequency is the number of occurrences of accidents which might induce HFO
spill per unit time (e.g. per year). DNV has carried out an FSA under the commission
of PAME, in which the accident frequency is estimated, shown in table 3. That is, a
grounding accident which would cause oil spill is likely to happen every 2.8 years.
Every 8.8 years, an oil spill would result from fire/explosion in Arctic. Ranked by
frequency, the hazard should be grounding, Fire/explosion, hull/machinery, ice damage
and collision.

Figure 8 shows an estimated annual spill mass from different ship types. Bulk carrier,
container and oil tanker, in addition with passenger ship, represent the highest risk of
HFO spill, corresponding with conclusion given in 2.1.2, that the first three types of
ships are dominant ship type carrying the most HFO as bunker.
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Table 3-Years between Likely Incident Leading to Oil Spill
Grounding

Fir/Exp

Hull/Mach

Ice Damage

Collision

2.8 years

8.8 years

10 years

39 years

70 years

Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2.

Figure 8-Estimated annual spill mass (tons)from Arctic shipping (four main accident
modes)-bunker oil only
Source: DNV. (2013). HFO IN THE ARCTIC-PHASE 2.

2.3.3
2.3.3.1

The Risk Cost of HFO
Environmental Cost

HFO spill poses environmental threats, especially in ecologically sensitive areas like
the Arctic. Viscous HFO is difficult to disperse or degrading naturally in Arctic cold
water, thereby making HFO spills highly persistent in regions like the Arctic waters.
The high density of HFO causes it to sink rather than float on the water surface. Sunken
HFO can resurface during warmer seasons and wash ashore long after all surface spills
have been cleaned up (Deere-Jones, 2016). In addition to the risks of oil spills, burning
HFO emits Black Carbon (BC), a small, dark particle emitted as a result of incomplete
combustion, while it is out of scope of this paper.
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2.3.3.2

Economic Cost

Economic risk is noticeable due to the high clean-up cost. Etkin (2000) estimated the
cleaning-up cost of oil spill for a variety of fuel types, including No. 2 fuel and No. 6
fuel, revealing that the cost of cleaning up HFO is the highest. Table 4 shows the
estimated cleanup costs based on the World Bank (2016) MUV (Roy, 2017). Also,
remoteness of Arctic areas may increase the clean-up cost significantly. Take the
Selendang Ayu bulk carrier oil spill as an example. The accident happened in December
2004, near Unalaska Island, Alaska, where 1,200 tonnes of residual fuel oil were spilled.
Clean-up was difficult because the site and oiled shorelines were accessible only by sea
or by air and the effort was coordinated by the Kodiak, AK, Coast Guard station more
than 1,000 kilometers away. Total cleanup costs reached $112 million (2005 USD), or
roughly $93,000 (2005 USD) per tonne. (Roy, 2017). For the above reasons, the AC
has called HFO “the most significant threat from ships to the Arctic environment” (AC,
2009).
Table 4-Estimated Cleanup Costs of Fuel Oil Spill
Fuel type

Cost
(2015 USD/tonne)

HFO

22,441

<0.5% S residual

16,831

Distillate (MGO)

3,055

Source: Roy, B. & Comer, B. (2017). Alternatives to heavy fuel oil use in the Arctic: Economic and
environmental tradeoffs.
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CHAPTER 3: PSSA and Its Idea
3.1

Idea of PSSA

According to IMO, a PSSA is an area that needs special protection through action by
IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, socio-economic or scientific
reasons and which may be vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities
(IMO). At the mean time of designation of a PSSA, Associated Protective Measures
(AMP) are adopted by IMO to prevent, reduce, or eliminate the threat or identified
vulnerability. PSSA derives from the resolution 9 of the International Conference on
Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention, 1978, on particularly sensitive sea area which
invited the IMO to initiate studies with a view to assessing the need of protection, as
well as the appropriate measures, to achieve a reasonable degree of protection and
legitimate use of the sea10. MEPC then started the work since 23rd session in 1986 under
the designation of IMO. At the very beginning, it only aimed at making full use of IMO
convention to propose measures for existing marine protected areas, especially those
areas beyond the territorial waters.

In 1994, IMO held a series of meetings along with University of Hull and IMO, to
discuss the significance of PSSA. Incorporating the conclusion of the meeting, a
reasonable summary about the idea of PSSA might be given:


Firstly, providing an evaluation tool to evaluate whether the sea area is vulnerable
and at grave risk from international shipping;



Secondly, adopt additional protective measures to deal with the risk from
international shipping, commonly using navigational safety measures like ship
routing, ship reporting, pilot assistance, etc.;



Thirdly, recognize the significance of the designated sea area from international
level, thus remind mariners to pay extra attention when operate in the area.

10

Resolution A.720(17), adopted on 6 November 1991, Guidelines for The Designation of Special Areas and
the Identification of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas.
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3.2

General Description of Existing PSSA

Currently, there are 17 PSSAs located all over the world. The distribution of existing
PSSAs are shown in figure 9. Once an area is identified as a PSSA, some specific
measures shall be established to control the maritime activities in that area thereby
protect the environment, such as routing measures, like it is illustrated in table 5.

Figure 9-The Map of PSSAs
Source: http://pssa.imo.org/index.htm#/globe

Table 5-the Existing PSSAs and APMs
PSSA

Proposing

Resolution

APMs

1990.9

recommended pilotage system；

states
Great

Australia

Barrier Reef
Great

MEPC. 44(30)
Australia

Barrier Reef Papua

2005.7

two-way route；

New MEPC.133(53)

and Torres Guinea

recommended pilotage system；
mandatory ship reporting system

Strait
Sabana

mandatory ship reporting system

Cuba

1997.9

Area To Be Avoided
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Camagüey
Malpelo

MEPC. 74(40）
Columbia

2002.3

Area To Be Avoided

MEPC. 97(47）
Florida

the

Keys

States

United 2002.3

Areas To Be Avoided;

of MEPC. 98(47）

America

encouragement for seafarers to
take

particular

care

when

navigating
Wadden Sea Netherlands,
Denmark,

2002.10

mandatory deep water route

MEPC. 101(48）

Germany
Paracas

Peru

2003.7

Area To Be Avoided

MEPC. 106(49）
Western

United

2004.10

Mandatory ship reporting system

Europe

Kingdom,

MEPC. 121(52）

Ireland,
Belgium,
France,
Spain,
Portugal
Canary

Spain

Islands

2005.7

Two traffic separation schemes;

MEPC. 134(53）

Areas To Be Avoided;
mandatory ship reporting system

Galapagos

Ecuador

2005.7

Area To Be Avoided;

MEPC. 135(53）

Two Traffic Separation Schemes;
Mandatory ship reporting

Baltic Sea

Denmark,

2005.7

New traffic separation schemes;

Estonia,

MEPC. 136(53）

Amendments to the deep water

Finland,

route;
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Germany,

Areas To Be Avoided

Latvia,
Lithuania,
Poland,
Sweden
Papahānau

United States

mokuākea

2008.4

Areas To Be Avoided;

MEPC. 171(57)

ship reporting system

2011.7

Mandatory

MEPC. 204(62)

system;

Marine
National
Monument
Bonifacio

Italy, France

ship

reporting

Recommended pilotage service;
Recommended two-way route
Saba Bank

Coral Sea

Netherlands

Australia

2012.10

Area To Be Avoided;

MEPC. 226(64)

Mandatory No Anchoring Area

2015.5

Two-way route;

MEPC.268(68)

Area to be avoided

Jomard

Papua

New 2016.10

Entrance

Guinea

MEPC.283(70)

Precautionary area

Tubbataha

Philippines

2017.7

Recommended pilotage system;

MEPC.294(71)

Area to be avoided

Reefs

3.3
3.3.1

Two-way route;

Two Cases of PSSA
Case 1-the Canary Island

The Canary Islands lie in the equatorial Atlantic, off the coast of Africa. Very large
crude oil tankers to and from the Persian Gulf pass through the routes near the islands.
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And they are at the center of the Canarys Current and the Azores Current. Ship routing
systems and compulsory reporting system are used in Canary Island to protect
venerable environment, like it is shown in table 6 and figure 10.
Table 6-The AMPs of Canary Island
AMPs

Description

Explanation

Traffic

Each three miles wide, guide Intensive traffic of large oil

separation

traffic between Fuerteventura, tankers bound for the Persian

schemes

Gran Canaria and Tenerife

Gulf. These vessels sail in ballast
along the north/south route and
loaded the south/north route.

Areas To Be Surround
Avoided

Lanzarote,

the

islands

Tenerife,

of Lanzarote, La Palma and El

Grand Hierro are biosphere reserve;

Canaria, La Palma and El Hierro, Tenerife and Grand Canaria are
applying to all shipping over 500 cetacean breeding ground11.
gross tons.

Compulsory

Tankers of 600 deadweight tons It is important for monitoring its

reporting

carrying oil and certain other track and launching search and
hydrocarbons must report to rescue measures, ensuring safe
CANREP on entering the PSSA, navigation
when leaving port, anchorage or pollution12.
deviating from their planned
route.

11
12

MEPC. 134(53). Appendix 1. Para. 2.1.
MEPC. 134(53). Appendix 2. Para. 3.2.1.
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and

preventing

Figure 10-A Chartlet of the Canary Islands PSSA and Its APMs
Source: IMO Resolution MEPC.134(53). Designation of the Canary Islands as a Particularly Sensitive
Sea Area.

3.3.2

Case 2-the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait

Protecting the Great Barrier Reef through nature reserves and national parks has a long
history, and the PSSA builds on earlier initiatives by the Australian Government. The
Torres Strait area was added to the PSSA in 2005, and introduced a two-way system for
ships passing through this shallow and hazardous channel.

The area is important for fishing and tourism, and the interests of local populations are
balanced against the need to conserve the interesting wildlife. The AMPs and chartlet
are shown in table 7 and figure 11 respectively.
Table 7- The AMPs of the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait
AMPs
Recommended
system

Application

Explanation

pilotage For large ships and carriers Parts of the Torres Strait
of hazardous materials.

are isolated, remote and
very demanding on the
navigator. Tidal streams
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can

be

strong

and

important

for

variable13.
Mandatory ship reporting Apply to ships operates It
system

is

along the entire offshore monitoring its track and
area.

launching

search

and

rescue measures, ensuring
safe

navigation

and

preventing pollution.
Two-way route

For traffic passing through There are narrow fairways
the shallow and hazardous and areas of converging
Torres Strait.

traffic that present a wide
range

of

carrying
cargoes,
dangerous
potentially
materials.

ship
a

types,

variety

of

including
goods

and

polluting
Ships

navigating in this area may
encounter concentrations
of fishing Bessel, tourist
vessels and recreational
craft14.

Noted that in the process of designation the Torres Strait as a PSSA, Australia and Papua
New Guinea submitted a joint proposal seeking an extension to the existing Great
Barrier Reef PSSA to include the waters of the Torres Strait because the number of
ships carrying noxious substances was increasing while a declining number of ships
following pilot regime. Therefore, the two states suggested the extension of the
13
14

MEPC. 133(53). para. 3.2.
MEPC. 133(53). para. 3.3.
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compulsory pilotage regime currently applicable in the Great Barrier Reef, to apply to
vessels when navigating the Torres Strait and the Great North East Channel, leading to
a series of debates between 2003 and 2005. Some states argued that there is no
international law basis for compulsory pilotage regime. Moreover, it was a violation of
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in terms of traditional
freedoms of navigation on straits used for international navigation. The IMO new
resolution in 2005 recommend pilotage rather than compulsion pilotage.

Figure 11-A Chartlet of the Torres Strait extension to the Great Barrier Reef PSSA
Source: IMO res, MEPS 53/24, Designation of the Torres Strait as an extension of the Great Barrier Reef
Particularly sensitive sea area, 22 July 2005.

3.3.3

A Summary of APMs

The chosen cases are two typical PSSAs that would provide some references to AAPCs.


For the sea areas where navigation conditions are complicated, e.g., tidal streams
are variable, channels are shallow and hazardous, pilotage systems might be
established;



For the sea areas where are pathway of high-risk ships, e.g., large oil tankers, ships
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carrying dangerous goods or potentially polluting materials as cargoes, or traffic is
intensive, traffic separation scheme is adopted;


In areas of ecological significance, area to be avoided, one of the elements of ship
routing, is established;



For remote areas where are difficult to conduct search and rescue, compulsory ship
reporting system is adopted.

Coastal States could directly apply these APMs in AAPCs within the legal framework
without designation as PSSA. But from the Torres Strait case, mandatory pilotage might
cause legal controversy.
3.4
3.4.1

Why AAPC instead of PSSA
PAAS has a Problem of Long Process

It would be a long procedure for IMO to adopt a PSSA, going through the assessment,
review and re-evaluation. For example, Denmark, Finland and Germany submitted the
proposal of designation Baltic Sea as a PSSA in December 2003, and the resolution of
designation Baltic Sea as PSSA was adopted in 2005, two years later. Similarly, it took
2 years to adopt the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait as a PSSA. According to the
accident frequency mentioned above, every 2.8 years there would be an accident
resulting oil spill. That is to say, Arctic is at HFO spill risk all the time. it would be risky
to take so long a period waiting for the adoption.

The use of HFO might be gradually banned in the future. From this point of view, the
measure discussing in this paper would be a transitional measure, in sore need of rapid
implementation. Too long a process would make it irrelevant.

3.4.2

The Problem of Delimitation

If designating Arctic as a PSSA, the main problem to be confronted is how to identify
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the size of the PSSA area. Given the ecological continuity of Artic, as well as the
discrete and widely distributed sensitive areas, the whole Arctic shall be designated as
one PSSA, which would make the PSSA the largest one in the world and might trigger
controversy. The Western European PSSA carries a strong warning. The large extent of
the first proposal was questioned by a number of States, and some argued that
consideration should have been given to proposing a number of smaller PSSAs within
the area. Finally, some concessions were made by Norway to reduce the size of the area
east of Shetland Isles (Julian Roberts, 2007). Figure 12 illustrates the original and
changed boundaries. Arctic is faced with a more difficult question if proposed as a
PSSA, a larger size of area, Within the area, there is a Hans Island existing dispute
over sovereignty between Canada and Denmark, making the issue even more
complicated.
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Figure 12-Limits of the Western European PSSA
Source: Robert, J. (2007). Marine Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation: The
Application and Future Development of the IMO’s Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept.

3.4.3

PSSA Has a Problem of Intrinsic Benefit

A sea area cannot get any additional protection solely from the designation of PSSA.
What really plays a role in the environmental protection is the AMP adopted by IMO.
Therefore, some scholars argue that PSSA is just providing a qualification and
foundation for IMO to adopt relevant AMP (Gerard Peet, 1994). The problem could be
observed in the process of designation Baltic Sea as a PSSA. At the time of submission
of the PSSA proposal, the proposing States did not identify any new APMs to provide
additional protection to the PSSA since this area had already taken many environmental
protection measures adopted by IMO. It evoked a fierce controversy. Some states argue
that the designation of PSSA without APMs cannot provide any effective protection
measures better than previous measures, that makes it unnecessary to designate a PSSA.
What is more, some scholars view the PSSA’s intrinsic benefit more negatively,
describing PSSA as an “empty boat” and a “roof”, for the lack of intrinsic protection
mechanism and under its framework using different tools to ensure compliance and
enforcement (Detjen, 2006).

The lack of intrinsic benefit of PSSA gives Arctic an optional shortcut, that is use the
idea, designate the areas that need protection then take proper measures within the legal
framework. In fact, numerous states have implemented routing measures for the
purpose of environmental protection without going through the process and identifying
and designation that area as a PSSA. And that is exactly what this paper discussing.
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CHAPTER 4: AAPC
4.1

Identification of AAPCs

4.1.1

The Application of PSSA Idea

PSSA idea shall be applied in Arctic area, taking additional measures to protect Arctic
from pollution especially from HFO pollution, bringing mariner’s attention on
ecological significance of Arctic and rising the environmental protection awareness in
Arctic. Like PSSAs, Arctic marine ecosystems host a vast array of over 2,000 species
of algae, tens of thousands of microbes and over 5,000 animal species. Current
estimates also suggest that many species are yet to be discovered (CAFF, 2014). The
estimated number is shown in the table 8, even more species of algae and fishes than
PERU which was designated as a PSSA by IMO in 2003. The Arctic area also meets
the Social, cultural and economic criteria and Scientific and educational criteria of
designation of PSSA. Like the PSSAs above, Arctic areas also have ecological, social,
cultural and educational value as well as vulnerability to damage by international
shipping traffic.
Table 8-Estimated Number of Taxa within Arctic Seas
Group

Estimated number

Bacteria

4,500-450,000

Archaea

Up to 5,000

Protists

2,800

Macrophytes

160

Invertebrates

~5,000

Algae

Over 2,000

Fishes

243

Birds

82

Mammals

16

Source: Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, Christine Michel, 2014
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4.1.2

Based on Hazard Identification

To apply PSSA idea in Arctic, some AAPCs are identified in this paper for better
drawing measures. Targeting at the hazard identified in Chapter 2, grounding, collision,
hull/machinery, fire/explosion and ice damage which potentially cause HFO spill in
Arctic, two categories of AAPCs shall be identified: high-traffic-risk areas and highice-risk areas. While the fundamental objective of identifying AAPCs is to protect
Arctic environment from HFO pollution, then the most vulnerable areas within Arctic
should also be taken into consider, the third category of AAPC, ecologically sensitive
areas.

4.2

AAPC1 High-Traffic-Risk Area

4.2.1

Four High-Traffic-Risk Areas

Kara Gate, Russia north coast, Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland, southwest
coast of Spitsbergen are four high-traffic-risk areas.


Kara Gate is the main shipping strait between the Barents and Kara seas (18
nautical miles long, minimum depth of 21 meters) in north coast of Russia, has
already established traffic separation scheme.



Russia northwest coast. This area consists of a series of narrow strait and shallow
water. Both the Kara Sea and the Barents Sea are shallow, with an average depth
of 90 meters and 10-100 meters along the southeastern coast respectively.
Yugorskiy Shar Strait, the southernmost entrance from the Barents to Kara seas, is
21 nautical miles long, 13-30 meters deep (AMSA, p. 23). Many ships have to pass
through the shallow water and narrow strait instead the common ship route via
Zhemaniya Cape because there are ports of Dikson, Dudinka and Sabetta.
Therefore, the Ob Bay, Khalmyer Bay and River Mouth of Yenisei are extremely
busy and of high density of ships especially in busy seasons. besides, this area is
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preferred by a high-risk ship type—oil tankers and container vessels (HFO). The
high-risk ships’ traffic map and ship density in busy season is shown in figure 13,
thus this area is as high traffic risk.

Figure 13- Traffic Map of High-risk Ship Types (Operating on HFO) and Ship Density
in Russia Northwest Coast, 2012
Source: Det Norske Veritas, HFO in the Arctic – Phase 2B, Report for PAME, DNV



Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland. It links Baffin Bay with the Labrador
Sea and the North Atlantic. At its narrowest point Davis Strait is about 300
kilometers wide; at its widest it is over 950 kilometers. There are five recognized
routes through Canadian Arctic Archipelago via Northwest Passage, while all
passages have common eastern and western approaches. In the east, ships must
proceed through the Labrador Sea, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay (AMSA, p. 20). In
addition, three main ports, Egedesminde, Godthab and, Sukkertoppen are located
to the east of Davis Strait, among which the Godthab is the largest port of
Greenland with oil tanker berth, making it a very busy in operating seasons. Shown
in figure 14, it is a main route for HFO-fueled containers and ship density in
September in extremely high, posing traffic threats on this area.
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Figure 14- Traffic Map of High-risk Ship Types (Operating on HFO) and Ship Density
in Davis Strait, 2012
Source: Det Norske Veritas, HFO in the Arctic – Phase 2B, Report for PAME, DNV



Southwest coast of Spitsbergen. A little different from the other three areas, the
Spitsbergen, largest island and of the Svalbard archipelago in northern Norway, is
occupied by ship types of oil tankers, reefers and passenger vessels operating on
HFO, mainly because of the coal mining, permanently population and tourism on
island. The vessel traffic is extremely busy from June to November. Figure 15
shows the three types of ships’ traffic map near Southwest coast of Spitsbergen and
the ship density in September.
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Figure 15- Traffic Map of High-risk Ship Types (Operating on HFO) and Ship Density
near Spitsbergen, 2012
Source: Det Norske Veritas, HFO in the Arctic – Phase 2B, Report for PAME, DNV

4.2.2

Characteristic of High-Traffic-Risk Area

The four areas have common characteristics.


They are traffic concentration zones of high-risk ships. In detail, high-risk ships
mean the ships with greatest HFO spill potential. Combing the accident frequency
calculated by DNV (2.3.2) and study about dominant ship type of using HFO from
ICCT (2.1.2), bulk carriers, containers and oil tankers adopt the most HFO in
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Arctic and represent the highest spill risk.
 They have high ship density especially in busy seasons. In Arctic, August and
September normally experience the highest density of ships. In these two months,
the traffic in the four areas is more busy than other areas in Arctic.

DNV’s report has evaluated the accident-induced oil spill risk that each area is faced
with. It shows that the riskiest area is Russian north coast, followed by Bering Strait,
Canada/Greenland and Spitsbergen. See figure 16, in the bar graph, red indicates
collision, green indicates fire/explosion, blue indicates hull/machinery and orange
indicates grounding. It is observed that the traffic route of high-risk ship type and traffic
density area in busy periods are basically coincident with high-risky areas. In addition,
in the four high-risky areas, grounding is the highest-frequency incident category.

Figure 16-High-risk Area of Incidents Resulting Oil Spill
Source: Det Norske Veritas, HFO in the Arctic – Phase 2B, Report for PAME, DNV
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4.2.3


Suggestions and Measures

Coastal States could establish traffic separation scheme, one of the elements of ship
routing and widely used as APMs in PSSAs, in these high-traffic-risk areas,
especially for ships operating without pilot ice assistance. Among these four areas,
Kara Gate has already established traffic separation scheme. Traffic separation
scheme would allow ships to follow well-defied lanes and separate opposing
steams of traffic, whilst ensuring ships avoid the shoals and islands that lie close
outside the traffic lane, thereby help to reduce the risks of collision and grounding
of ships as well as the risk of HFO pollution arising from accidental oil spill.



Recommendatory track also could be used for ships’ safety navigation after
conducting appropriate hydrographical survey, especially in the shallow water or
narrow strait. Following the recommendatory, the risk of reef collision and
grounding would be reduced.

4.3

AAPC2 High-Ice-Risk Area

4.3.1

An overview of Sea Ice

Sea ice is simply frozen ocean water. It grows during the winter months and melts
during the summer months, but some sea ice remains all year in certain regions
(National Snow & Ice Data Center [NSIDC]). There are several parameters of sea ice
that have impact on ship navigation safety. The ice type, thickness and concentration
are factors that are most commonly considered to assess the risk during ice navigation.
4.3.2
4.3.2.1

Significant Sea Ice Factors
Type of Ice and Ice Thickness

According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the definition of ice type
and ice thickness are in the table 9.
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Table 9-Relationship between Ice Type and Ice Thickness
Type of Ice

Thickness of Ice

New Ice

New generated ice

Nilas

Nark Nilas

Thickness≤5cm

Light Nilas

Thickness5-10cm

The ice types above do not impact ship navigation
Young

Grey Ice

Thickness10-15cm

Ice

Grey-White Ice

Thickness15-30cm

First-

First-Year Thin Ice

Thickness30-70cm

Year Ice

First-Year Medium Ice

Thickness70-120cm

First-Year Thick Ice

Thickness120-200cm

Second-Year Ice

Melt remaining of at least one summer, >2.5m

Multi-Year Ice

Melt remaining of at least two summers, >3m

Old Ice

Source: The Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s Republic of China. (2014). Guidance on
Arctic Navigation in the Northeast Route, 2014.

4.3.2.2

Ice concentration

Ice concentration is a unitless term that describes the relative amount of area covered
by ice, compared to some reference area. It typically is reported as a percentage (0 to
100 percent ice), a fraction from 0 to 1, or sometimes in tenths (0/10 to 10/10). (NSIDC).
It is an indicator to show how much difficult to navigate in ice region. Table 10 show
the observation of different ice concentration and their impact on navigation.

Table 10-Ice Concentration, Its Observation and Impact on Navigation
Ice

Ice Region

Observation

Concentration
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Navigation

0/10

Ice Free

<1/10

Open Water

1/10~3/10

Very Open Drift

Free Navigation

Cannot

follow

the

planned course

4/10~6/10

Open Drift

Navigation

is

obstructed

7/10~8/10

Close Pack

9/10

Very Close Pack

10/10

Cannot

navigate

without

icebreaker

assistance

Compact
Ice/Consolidated Ice

Source: The Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s Republic of China. (2014). Guidance on
Arctic Navigation in the Northeast Route, 2014.

4.3.3

Sea Ice-Induced HFO Spill Hazards

The ice damage is not a formal risk category in the HIS Fairplay database, and this
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category is more limited to what may be calculated based on the data (DNV, 2013).
Although no oil spill volumes may be derived or reported until now, the ice indeed
poses a significant threat on ships operating in Arctic. The Polar Code identified 8
sources of hazards in Arctic shipping, among them ice is the primary one.
Generally, sea ice may cause hull damage thus directly result oil spill.


Ship collides with ice when heading in high speed in sea region, which may damage
ship bow and surrounding area.



Ship collides with under-water ice ridge or with ice on the edge of water channel,
which may damage broadside, bilge side and bottom.



Ship goes astern in severe ice condition, which may cause stern damaged.



Ship is pushed around by moving ice, or get trapped in the moving ice thus under
the high ice pressure, resulting a damage of parallel middle body.

In addition to the structural failure mentioned above, there are some other ice-induced
hazard would indirectly cause HFO spill. For example, loss of stability because of ice
on ship superstructure, high corrosion rate resulted from friction between the hull and
ice resulting, structure vibration caused by ice load or failure of systems because of ice
ingestion from sea water, all these may direct hull damage of foundering, thus result in
oil spill.

4.3.4

Navigational Season in Arctic
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Figure 17-Arctic Sea Ice Extent in Different Months
Source: https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/charctic-interactive-sea-ice-graph/

Illustrated by figure 17, regardless of how the extent reduces with the years, the trend
within one year by months is always the same: February to April experience the largest
area of sea ice, then a downtrend shows up until lowest point in August and October,
the best period for navigation in Arctic with more open water. However, even in the
most seaworthy season, at least 15% of Arctic Sea is covered with ice.

Obviously, the ships’ navigation is influenced by the ice regime, a general description
of sea ice conditions, which is illustrated by figure 18. Averagely, August and
September have the largest area of open water and almost all ships can navigate freely.
While ice class ships have a longer operation period of more than eight months with
the assistance of icebreaker, followed by other non-ice class ships with icebreaker
assistance of six-months operation period. Ordinary ships without the assistance of
icebreaker would only navigate in Arctic for less than four months.
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Figure 18- Possible Navigation Season and Ships’ Navigational Capability
Source: CCS. (2018). A Lecture about Polar Ship Navigation Regulation.

4.3.5
4.3.5.1

High-Ice-Risk Areas
One High-Ice-Risk Area On NWP

The high-ice-risk area in NWP consists of three locations, shown in figure 19,
respectively marked as location 1, 2 and 3.


Location 1, M’Clure Strait, 120 km wide at east end, 275 km long to Beaufort Sea,
deep at over 400, experiences old ice of high concentration even in September.



Loction 2, Viscount Melville Sound, 100 km wide, 350 km long, experiences multiyear and high concentration ice from M’Clure Strait.



Location 3, Victoria Strait, 120 km wide, at southern end is blocked by Royal
Geographical Society Island, worst ice conditions along the mainland coast of
Canada.

The ice chart from Canada Ice Service shows that the northern coast of Greenland and
northwest coast of the Canadian Archipelago also have severe ice conditions, but these
are not commonly used sea routes.
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Figure 19-Three Locations of High-Risk-Area on NWP and Their Ice Regime
Source: http://iceweb1.cis.ec.gc.ca/CISWebApps/page1.xhtml?lang=en

4.3.5.2

Four High-Ice-Risk Areas on NSR

The operation condition of NSR is not as challenging as NWP but with higher risk, this
is because more ships carrying or using HFO operate on NSR than NWP. And there are
still 4 high-ice-risk areas which are illustrated by figure 20. The 4 dangerous areas are
labeled as 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the upper right map, following the high-ice-risk area on NWP,
and are respectively corresponding to the other 4 charts with same number. And the
four charts give more specific information about ice development stage in June, 2018.



Area 2 is the south-western part and north-eastern part of Kara Sea. The whole
Kara Sea has an ice concentration of more than 9/10 from December to April
because Novaya Zemlya blocks the warm current (Maritime Safety Administration
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[MSA], 2014, p. 84). In June, this area is covered with old ice and multi-year ice
with a high concentration of 9-10/10.


Area3, the western part of the Laptev Sea, is covered with thick first-year ice in
June. Even in September, there is an ice concentration of 4/10~5/10 between the
east entrance of Vilkitskogo Strait and 76°N, forming an ice accumulation area in
the east coast of Taymyr Peninsula (MSA, 2014, p.86). What is more, there is
iceberg risk near the east coast of Severnaya Zemlya.



Area 4, northern-east part of the East Siberian Sea has a highest proportion of
multi-year ice in winter (MSA, 2014, p. 85), with a large area of thick fist-year and
some gray ice surrounded by open water in June, making the navigation condition
more complicated.



Area 5 is northern-west part of Chukchi Sea. The Wrangel Island is surrounded by
thick first-year ice and small area of multi-year ice.

Figure 20-High-Ice-risk Areas on NSR, June 2018
Source: http://www.nsra.ru/en/home.html
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4.3.6


Suggestions and Measures

Pilot and icebreaker assistance. Pilot may give the ship master recommendations
regarding assessment of ice conditions, selection of optimum route, ways of the
maintenance of safe speed and distance to icebreaker or ship ahead when moving
in convoy. While icebreaker makes channels in ice, a group of ships and allocation
of ships follow the icebreaker, sailing of ship through the channel behind icebreaker
in tow, without towing in the independent mode or within a group of ships. Both
Russia and America require mandatory icebreaker and pilot assistance in some
specific areas, but Canada may fail to provide pilot assistance at any time because
of the limited number of icebreakers.



Set mandatory speed limitation according to ship ice class. Operating at a safe
speed in high-risk waters can reduce likelihood of hull penetration in the event of
an accident. Table 11 provides an optional speed for ships in different ice regime.
Take ice class XUELONG as an example, its normal speed is 15 knots, and slow
down to 12 knots when ice concentration is 3/10~4/10, to 8~10 knots when ice
concentration is 5/10~6/10, to 3~5 knots when ice concentration is 8/10~10/10.

Table 11-Optional Speed in Different Ice Regimes
Ice regime

Optional speed

Ice concentration <4/10~5/10

Normal speed

Ice concentration 6/10~7/10

Slow speed

Night navigation in ice region

Lower speed than daytime

Poor visibility

Minimize speed to keep steering

Source: MSA, Guidance on Arctic Navigation in the Northeast Route 2014



Detect sea bottom condition in key areas and designate anchorage area where
condition is appropriate for ships in need of anchorage. For example, waiting for
pilotage assistance. Designation of anchorage area could help to avoid ships anchor
in wrong areas because of unfamiliarity with sea bottom condition, unfamiliarity
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with the position and distance of iceberg around, drift direction and speed, etc. thus
resulting grounding or collision with ice.
4.4

AAPC 3- Ecologically Sensitive Areas

4.4.1

The Criterion of Ecologically Sensitive Areas

The ecologically sensitive areas could be incorporated into the Ecologically or
Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs), which was adopted by Conservation of Arctic
Fluro and Fauna (CAFF). The EBSAs harbors Arctic species of populations and play
an important role in protect the unique Arctic ecosystem. There are 11 EBSAs which
are widely distributed in Arctic. Its criteria are similar to the criteria of PSSA, including:
•

Uniqueness or rarity

•

Special importance for life history stages of species

•

Importance for threatened, endangered or declining species and/or habitats

•

Vulnerability, fragility, sensitivity or slow recovery

•

Biological productivity

•

Biological diversity

•

Naturalness

4.4.2

11 Ecologically Sensitive Areas and Their Significance

The distribution of ecologically sensitive areas (figure 21) and their ecological
significance (table 12) are as follows:
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Figure 21-Distribution of EBSAs in Arctic area
Source：Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs), CAFF

Table 12-Description of EBSAs in Arctic Area
Number Area
①

Coastal

Description
Waters

Chukotka

of An important area for aquatic birds to
stage, moult and nest. In winter, coastal
zone harbors ringed and bearded seals and
their predators.

②

Wrangel-Gerald Shallows A migratory pathway for bowhead whales,
and Ratmanov Gyre

beluga whales, polar bears, Pacific walrus
and gray whales. In winter, the polynyas
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harbor ringed and bearded seals and their
predators.
③

Great Siberian Polynya

Polar cod gather in this area, providing
food for predators. Laptev polynyas
support a chain of colonies of thick-billed
murre and black-legged kittiwake mainly.
The network also sustains seals, and draw
its main predator, the polar bear.

④

Ob-Enisei River Mouth

The area supports globally threatened
species like Steller’s eider, velvet scoter
and long-tailed duck, harbors sea ducks,
geese and swans, etc., and provides feeding
ground for beluga whales and polar bears
in summer.

⑤

North-eastern

Barents– The region is important for seabirds, polar

Kara Sea

bears, diverse zooplankton and polar cod,
endangered

bowhead

whale, Atlantic

walrus, and most of the world’s breeding
population of the threatened ivory gull.
⑥

Coast of Western and This area supports the largest seabird
Northern Novaya Zemlya colonies

in

the

North-East Atlantic.

Threatened Steller's eider and longtailed
duck stage and moult here. It also serves as
an important feeding ground for Atlantic
walruses.
⑦

South-eastern

Barents This area provides food for sea ducks,

Sea (the Pechora Sea)

walruses and stopover site for waterfowl
species during their migrations. Beluga
whales feed here and migrate via this area.
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It supports the only European stock of
Arctic cisco and is a migration area for the
Pechora Atlantic salmon stock.
⑧

Multi-year Ice of the The multi-year ice is important for polar
Central Arctic Ocean

bears southern and northern Beaufort Sea
subpopulations to breed.

⑨

White Sea

It is migration routes of Atlantic salmon. It
provides aquatic birds breeding grongd and
eiders nesting areas. Sealsand feed, whelp
and moult and beluga whales mate here.

⑩

Murman

Coast

and It is used as a spawning area by several

Varanger Fjord

species of pelagic fishes, while the coast
contains many seabird colonies.

⑪

The Marginal Ice Zone It is feeding areas for ice-associated
and the Seasonal Ice- species, providing habitat to breed, moult
Cover

and rest for certain marine mammals.

Source: https://www.caff.is/protected-and-important-areas/ebsas

4.4.3

Suggestions and Measures

Area to be avoided, one of ship routing’s elements, is an area within defined limits in
which either navigation is particularly hazardous, or it is exceptionally important to
avoid casualties, and which should be avoided by all ships, or by certain classes of ships
(IMO). But designating all the 11 EBASs as areas to be avoided would significantly
impair ships’ normal operation in Arctic, especially in busy seasons. So, the 11 EBSAs
are categorized into three according to the annual ship densities in Arctic from DNV
report and their relevant measures are shown in table 13.
Table 13-Associated Measures of the Ecologically Sensitive Areas
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Area

Description

Measures

①, ②, ③, These areas only have Seasonal areas to be avoided could be
⑤, ⑥ and
⑪

traffic in the busiest months established, allowing ships to operate in
approximately from July to busy seasons excluding oil tankers,
October.

ships operating on HFO, etc. while
prohibit ships to enter in off-peak
seasons.

④ and ⑦

These areas are essential Use recommendatory track, appropriate
even in the less operating traffic separation scheme to reduce
seasons.

⑨ and ⑧

accidental pollution risk.

These areas are barely They shall be designated as areas to be
affected

by the

vessel avoided, according to the navigation

traffic even in the busiest condition and applying to specific ships,
seasons.

for example, oil tanker above some
specific tonnage or all ships operating
on HFO, etc.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS
HFO has posed a huge threat on Arctic environment. IMO is working on reducing the
risk of HFO in Arctic. In addition to the Sulphur cap in 2020, the Arctic is expected
to usher in an age with no HFO. Before a complete prohibition of HFO in Arctic, some
mitigation measures are in urgent need. Although the Arctic area meets criteria of
designation of PSSA, it would be a long process to adopt the Arctic as a PSSA, which
makes it unreasonable as a transitional measure. Meanwhile, the lack of intrinsic benefit
of PSSA offers Arctic an opportunity to select a shortcut—use PSSA idea, identify
AAPCs to draw up navigational safety measures to protect Arctic environment. Since
the main hazards that potentially result in oil spill are grounding, fire/explosion,
hull/machinery, ice damage and collision, which happens approximately once 2.8 years,
8.8 years once, 39 years once, 70 years once and 90 years once respectively. And in
terms of ship types, bulk carriers, containers and oil tankers carry the most HFO and
travel longest distances in Arctic, generating 4 high-traffic-risk areas and 4 high-icerisk areas. In addition to the 11 ecologically sensitive areas, a complete AAPC map is
drawn.

In PSSAs, the adopted APMs are normally ship routing, ship reporting, pilot assistance
protecting environment from accidental pollution through enhancing navigation safety.
There is little chance of operational pollution from ships under Polar Code, so the APM
of PSSA could be applied to AAPCs to reduce accident risk. In 4 high-traffic-risk areas,
separation scheme could be applied. In 5 high-ice-risk areas, Coastal States could adopt
speed limitation, enhance icebreaker and pilot assistance. In 11 ecologically sensitive
areas, perennial or seasonal area to be avoided could be established, especially for ships
operating on HFO.

This paper has some limitations. Specific ship routing measures, especially traffic
separation scheme cannot be drawn up due to the lack of meteorological hydrological
data. So, there are only an outline of suggestions and measures. Besides, the absence of
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field research makes this paper limited to theory.
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